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Abstract: Global concern for the illicit transportation and trafficking of nuclear materials and other 
radioactive sources is on the rise, with efficient and rapid security and non-proliferation 
technologies in more demand than ever. Many factors contribute to this issue, including the 
increasing number of terrorist cells, gaps in security networks, politically unstable states across the 
globe and the black-market trading of radioactive sources to unknown parties. The use of passive 
gamma-ray and neutron detection and imaging technologies in security-sensitive areas and ports 
has had more impact than most other techniques in detecting and deterring illicit transportation 
and trafficking of illegal radioactive materials. This work reviews and critically evaluates these 
techniques as currently utilised within national security and non-proliferation applications and 
proposes likely avenues of development.  




Due to the hazardous ionising and activating nature of neutron and gamma radiation, there is a 
requirement to control and monitor the radiological materials, which produce them. Neutron and 
gamma-ray detection can directly lead to the identification of radiological sources in general, 
including nuclear materials. Due to the potential of these materials to be developed into nuclear 
weapons, these substances can pose direct threats to national security, and so are of great interest. 
Illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and other radiological sources present a global threat that 
international organisations such as the IAEA are forced to tackle frequently [1, 2]. The IAEA Incident 
and trafficking database reported 3235 confirmed incidents of nuclear and other radioactive materials 
out of regulatory control between 1993 and 2017. Of these incidents, 278 were associated with 
trafficking or malicious use of materials such as highly-enriched uranium, plutonium and plutonium-
beryllium neutron sources [2]. This issue highlights the importance of the effective control of nuclear 
and radiation materials at national and international cross points such as borders, ports and airports. 
Effective application of radiation detection techniques requires knowledge of the environment 
in which the technology will be implemented, and the associated circumstances. In a controlled 
detection area such as an airport checkpoint, border line checkpoint, cargo inspection checkpoint or 
air cargo inspection, the space, and in most cases the physical contact time, allow for a reasonable 
level of flexibility. In an uncontrolled detection area such as buffer zones, airports terminals, train 
stations and public roads, space and physical contact time are less flexible and require more advanced 
detection technologies [3].  




This review compares the various technologies utilised in radiation portal monitoring (RPM) of 
illicit radioactive materials including radiation sources, by-product materials and nuclear materials, 
with a view of identifying their advantages and limitations.  
2. Radioactive materials, nuclear materials and radiation sources: 
Radioactive materials are defined by the IAEA as materials being designated in national law or 
by a regulatory body as being subject to regulatory control because of their radioactivity [4].  Nuclear 
material is similarly defined as: 
 
 Any plutonium isotope concentration except that with 80% or more of 238Pu 
 Uranium enriched in the isotopes 233U or 235U 
 Uranium containing the mixture of isotopes as occurring in nature other than in the form of ore 
or ore-residue 
 Any material containing one or more of the above [4]. 
A radiation source is usually defined as artificially refined radioactive material produced 
outside the nuclear fuel cycles of research and power reactors [4, 5]. The choice of radiation detection 
technology employed is primarily based on the radiation type being emitted, the amount of radiation, 
the energy spectra and whether the radioactive isotope needs to be identified. Predominantly, nuclear 
security-based applications are interested in detecting either gamma-rays (typically E>10 keV), 
and/or neutrons [6-8]. Gamma-rays are typically emitted from an excited nucleus going from a higher 
energy state to a lower energy state, usually following the decay of its parent nucleus. Several 
mechanisms, such as fission and fusion reactions, neutron capture reactions, annihilation reactions 
and activation processes, can all result in the emission of gamma-rays. Because gamma-ray assay and 
spectra measurements are the easiest and most common technologies, they are of tensed to identify 
and differentiate different nuclear materials and their isotopic composition [7]. Figure 1 shows the 
gamma-ray intensity spectra and characteristic peaks for various nuclear material isotopes [7, 9, 10].  
 





Figure 1. Characteristic gamma spectrum and gamma peaks of nuclear materials isotopes a. 241Pu, b. 
240Pu, c. 239Pu, d. 233U, e. 235U, f.238U (Data source: Idaho National Engineering & Environmental 
Laboratory [9]). 
Other gamma emitting radiation sources that are often found to be involved in illicit trafficking 
are 192Ir, 137Cs and 241Am [2]. Figure 2 shows gamma-ray characteristic peaks of these three isotopes. 





Figure 2. Gamma-ray characteristic energies and energy peaks of 192Ir, 137Cs and 241Am. 
Neutron emission detection and neutron assay is another common procedure used to detect and 
identify nuclear materials and radiation sources [6, 7]. Neutron sources in nature and industry can 
be categorised as spontaneous fission sources, reactor sources, alpha-neutron sources, photo-neutron 
(or gamma-neutron) sources and ion accelerator sources as shown in Table 1 [6, 11-13]. 
Table 1. Neutron sources and average energies. 
Neutron Source Neutron Source Type Average Neutron Energy (MeV) Half-Life (years) 
252Cf Spontaneous fission 1-3 (2.35 1) 2.645 
241Am-9Be Alpha-neutron source 4.2 432.2 
239Pu-9Be Alpha-neutron source 4 – 5 24,114 years 
124Sb-9Be Photo-neutron source 0.025 (close to mono-energetic) 0.164 (60 days) 
D-D reaction Accelerator source 2.4 (close to mono-energetic) N/A 
D-T reaction Accelerator source 14.1(close to mono-energetic) 12.32 
 
Production of tritium from accelerator-based sources is effected by the closure of tritium-production 
reactors, non-proliferation policies and funding cuts. Other sources of tritium are breeding 
redactions in lithium blankets [14]. Other possible sources of neutron are D_Li-reactions [15] and 
spallation reactions [16]. Neutron multiplicity υ̃, or the number of neutrons emitted per fission, is a 
parameter obtained in the result of an analysis or measure. Table 2 gives a list of spontaneous 
fission isotopes commonly subjected to neutron multiplicity assays [6, 7, 10, 17]. 
Table 2. Spontaneous fission isotopes and neutron multiplicity. 
Isotope Neutron Number Total Half-Life (years) Average Spontaneous Fission Multiplicity 
242Cm 146 0.447 2.528 
249Bk 152 0.877 3.4 
252Cf 154 2.645 3.768 
248Cm 148 3.84 3.161 
240Pu 146 6.56 2.151 
238Pu 144 87.7 2.21 
238U 143 4.47E9 2.0 
235U 146 7.04E8 1.87 
 
                                                          
1 Reference [8], page 93. 




Induced fission multiplicity depends on the fission isotopes and the energy of the incident 
neutrons [17, 18]. Figure 3 illustrates neutron spectrum multiplicity for nuclear materials 235U and 
239Pu as functions of energy. 
  
Figure 3. Neutron multiplicity as function of incident neutron energy for 235U and 239Pu. 
Unlike gamma-rays, the wide energy spectrum of emitted neutrons and the change in their 
energy as they traverse materials, make source identification through the energy of emitted neutrons 
a less effective method of detection. However, the increasing volume of research in this field such as 
the research in the field of neutron scattering cameras may indicate the emergence of new 
technologies [19-23]. 
3. Problem definition and authorities’ requirements. 
The major concern involving illicit trafficking and proliferation of nuclear materials is the threat 
of using these materials in criminal activities and terrorist acts. This concern has been gradually 
increasing during the last three decades and is becoming a definite threat in times of international 
instability and travel. The subject of illegal nuclear trafficking and unlawful nuclear acts is becoming 
the primary concern of international and global agencies such as the IAEA [24], European 
Commission [25] and Interpol [26]. Other factors including the economic and political impacts of this 
illicit trafficking are also part of the multithreaded problem.  
As with many illegal acts at the international level, security plans and prevention policies along 
with international legislation have been implemented to deter and prevent illicit trafficking and to 
promote nuclear non-proliferation.  Examples of these plans and treaties are the Treaty on Non-
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1970 [27] and IAEA safeguards agreement and Code of Conduct 
on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources in 2004 [28]. Another example of international 
cooperation to deter  illicit trafficking of nuclear materials is demonstrated by the adoption of the 
practices espoused in the Handbook of Nuclear Law produced by the IAEA [29]. This is the result of 
international organisations assisting legislation and regulatory bodies in member states in creating a 
strong and robust regulatory framework [29]. Other international,  regional and cross continent 
agreements   such as the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 
(ICSANT) [30] are part of the global effort to combat and prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear and 
radiological materials. 
The safeguarding of radioactive materials in general is a continuous process, from the generation 
stage to the decommissioning stage, especially for nuclear materials. The uninterrupted tracking of 
these materials is the optimal method to safeguard and diminish the possibilities of illegal trafficking. 




While the situation norm is the controlled and legal transport of radioactive materials, incidents are 
still reported [2]. A series of protocols and procedures have been implemented at the national and 
international level to prevent these incidents. One of the most important factors in this process is the 
implementation of the means of detecting, identifying and localising radioactive materials using 
radiation detection equipment and radiation imaging techniques.  
The main purpose of implementing detection and imaging technologies in these applications is 
the timely and accurate identification of illegal acts and the generation of evidence to enforce legal 
proceedings to eliminate trafficking networks [24, 31]. The implementation of radiation detection and 
imaging technologies varies from state to state, but these technologies are generally implemented on 
sites where radioactive sources’ life cycles are spent, such as nuclear reactors, hospitals, etc., and at 
national and international cross borders. Many parameters affect the efficacy of radioactive material 
detection [32], with the main factor being the performance of the technologies employed, especially 
their ability to identify and localise radioactive sources [24, 32]. Other directly related parameters that 
can influence the choice of technology employed are the field of view, the potential targets and the 
time constraints. The area of interest is the location where the detection or imaging instrument will 
be stationed and the zone that needs to be monitored. As implied in the Introduction, this area can 
be categorised as controlled or uncontrolled and varies in terms of the size of the area to be scanned, 
the detector to source distance, the number of people/vehicles/items to be monitored and the extent 
of the shielding or obstructions in the vicinity. The nature of the potential targets affects the choice of 
detection or imaging system due to their inherent shielding characteristics, i.e. nuclear material 
hidden inside the engine block of a large truck will be difficult to detect from a distance due to the 
significant shielding this environment affords. In addition, regulations that preclude the use of active 
interrogation systems on targets for health and safety reasons may also affects the selection process, 
if scanning pedestrians or queues of passengers, for instance. Timing is another parameter that affect 
the selection process. Controlled areas such as airports and land ports are busy areas. For example, 
the daily average number of people at a busy airport like Heathrow Airport is over 200,000 
passengers per day [33]. There will be a limit to how long passengers can be held for security checks 
for logistical reasons. . Therefore, detection efficiency, data analysis speed and spatial resolution are 
key aspects of the specification of the technologies employed. The size of the detection or imaging 
system can as well be seen as a factor on the selection process. Pocket-type instruments are used to 
detect the presence of radioactive materials and in some cases the radiation level, usually to calculate 
personal dose. Hand-held instruments have higher sensitivity and can be used to detect, locate and 
characterise radioactive sources. Finally, fixed and vehicle-based devices are usually used at borders 
cross-points, seaports and similar controlled areas [32]. 
The IAEA suggests that there are over a hundred different forms of non-destructive analysis 
techniques available to be used in the process of identifying radioactive materials [31]. However, the 
most common detection and imaging devices utilise gamma-rays and/or neutrons. The specification 
of suitable gamma-ray and neutron detection equipment varies according to legislation and the 
safeguarding abilities of states. A set of criteria have been recommended by the IAEA in a 
collaboration with World Custom Organization (WCO), EUROPOL and INTERPOL. The main 
components in this set of recommendations are [31, 34]: 
Gamma-ray systems requirements: 
 
 At a mean dose rate of 0.2 Sv/h, the alarm of the system should be activated when the dose 
rate increases in period of 1 second by 0.1Sv/h for a pocket size instrument, by 0.05Sv/h 
for a handheld instrument and 0.1Sv/h for a fixed-installation instrument, for duration of 
one second with 99% detection accuracy. 
 False alarm rate should be minimal, with background measures of 0.2Sv/h, with false 
alarms rate of less than 1 every 12 hours for pocket size instruments, less than 6 per hour for 
handheld instruments and less than 1 per day for fixed-installation instruments. 




Neutron systems requirements: 
 The alarm of the system should be activated above a threshold of 20,000 n/s with a source to 
detector distance of 0.25 m for handheld instruments and 20,000 n/s in 5s with source to 
detector distance of 2.0 m for fixed-installation instruments, using system with 99% detection 
accuracy. 
 False alarm rate should be minimal with less than 6 per hour for handheld instruments and 
1 per day for fixed-installation instruments. 
Similarly, the American National Standard for Evaluation and Performance of Radiation 
Detection Portal Monitors for Use in Homeland Security have a set of criteria for gamma-ray and 
neutron equipment, however the set of requirements are relative to initial reference settings within 
the equipment [35]. Applying these requirements might limit direct implementation and might affect 
the response of the system. TECMIPT Test Operations Procedures (TTOP) For Radiation Detection 
Systems – Specific Methods specifies the minimum performance requirements for gamma-ray and 
neutron detection instruments [36]. These specifications have direct implementation and offer 
detailed requirements relative to the size category of the system.   
Gamma-ray systems requirements: 
 
 The alarm of the system should be activated when the count increases above background level 
by 0.5Sv/h in 2 s for Radionuclide Identification Devices (RIDs) in the pocket and handheld size 
categories. 
 The alarm of the system should be activated with 232Th, 137Cs, and 133Ba, 60Co and 57Co sources 
moving past the system at a speed of 2.22 m/s and distance of closest approach of 3 m for RIDs 
in the fixed installation size category.  
 False alarm rate should be minimal with less than 1 every 10 hours for pocket size and handheld 
instruments and less than one every two hours for fixed-installation size instruments. 
Neutron systems requirements: 
 The alarm of the system should be activated when the exposure is above the threshold of 20,000 
n/s in 2 s with 252Cf sources with a source to detector distance of 0.25 m for RIDs in the pocket 
size and handheld size categories.  
 For a moving 252Cf source with activity of 20,000 n/s and moving past the system at a speed of 
2.22 m/s at a distance of closest approach of 3 m, the system has to be able to detect the source 
with up to 1 cm steel or 0.5 cm of lead of shielding for RIDs in the fixed installation size category.  
 False alarm rate should be minimal with less than 1 every 10 hours for pocket size and handheld 
instruments and less than one every two hours for fixed-installation size instruments.  
4. Physical and electronic collimations  
Neutrons and gamma-rays are uncharged high-energy radiation fields. Conventional 
converging and diverging techniques, as well as other optical techniques, are not applicable in this 
case.  A device is needed to precisely identify the lines along which detected radiation fields are 
generated. Collimation is the key word here. Collimation of incident radiation can be done physically 
and/or electronically. Physical collimation and electronic collimation are well-established imaging 
techniques in the field of radiation detection The basic concepts of each of these two collimation 
technique are discussed in this section.  
4.1. Physical collimation 
Physical collimators are patterns of highly attenuating materials positioned in front of a detector 
to limit the direction of incident radiation quanta to specific directions. As a result, a shadow image 
is formed on the detector resulting in greatly improved spatial resolution. However, this approach 
causes a noticeable decline in the efficiency of the system since it limits the number of detectable 




radiation quanta [37]. Physical collimation for gamma-rays is more effective at lower energies as the 
as the probability ofpenrtation through matter increases with gamma-ray energies above the energy 
peak of Compton scattering. 
The simplest physical collimator design is the pinhole collimator, which consists of a single small 
aperture. This technique offers excellent angular resolution; however, it limits the geometrical 
efficiency ofthe system. Parallel holes collimator, converging and diverging collimators are arrays of 
opaque and transparent photon channels used in imaging where the system scans across the entire 
field of view. The technique improves the angular resolution of the system and slightly increases the 
solid angle. Figure 4.1 shows schematics of physical collimators types.    
 
Figure 4. Schematic of physical collimator types. 
A coded aperture is an alternative and popular form of physical collimation that was originally 
proposed for astrophysics measurements. It was first analytically proven effective for imaging 
systems in 1968 [38, 39]. Commonly based on a 50% open mask with a large number of randomly 
distributed pinholes lying in a parallel plane with the detector, the technique offers higher efficiency 
compared to previously mentioned collimation techniques. Figure 5 illustrates the basic parameters 
of coded aperture imaging systems. 
 




Figure 5.  A schematic of coded aperture imaging system, with a coded aperture mask that is made 
with a pattern of opaque and open cells of highly attenuating materials followed by a radiation 
sensitive detector. Incident radiation field are attenuated in the coded aperture mask; with only a 
fraction of incident radiation is transmitted and detected on the system. (Based on reference [38]). 
Coded aperture masks have greatly evolved since their inception, and in most cases their design 
can be tailored to fit the application requirements. There are generally two types of coded apertures: 
passive masks and active masks. In the case of passive masks, a highly absorbing material is used to 
stop and eliminate non-normally directed radiation quanta from reaching the detector. The choice of 
materials in passive masks mainly depend on the type of target radiation. High density/atomic 
number materials such as lead, tungsten and depleted uranium are often used to block high energy 
photons, while neutron absorbing materials such as high-density polyethylene (HDPE) and 
Gadolinium are used in coded apertures for neutron detection [40, 41]. Passive physical collimation 
shows noticeable drawbacks over a considerable range of the energy spectrum, especially at high 
energies where radiation fields have enough energy to penetrate the opaque pattern of the mask [42-
44]. On the other hand, active coded aperture designs use radiation sensitive materials, such as B- 
and Gd-doped glass plates for detecting low energy neutrons, as part of the collimation and detection 
process, which allows the detection of radiation quanta with a wider energy range [45-48]. Most of 
these active collimation examples combine physical collimation and Compton scattering in one 
system by using a pattern of large area detectors. Physical collimation is mainly utilised for detection 
of low gamma-ray energies, while Compton scattering is utilised for higher energy gamma-rays. 
Generally, the trade-off between angular resolution and detection efficiency is unavoidable in 
physical collimation. Higher activity sources or longer acquiring times (or both) are usually 
recommended to improve the efficiency of these systems.  
4.2. Electronic Collimation: Compton camera and neutron scattering camera 
Electronic collimation (widely known as a Compton camera for gamma-ray detection and 
neutron scattering camera for fast neutron detection) is a well-studied collimation approach, 
especially utilised within gamma-ray detection. Gamma Compton cameras are comprised of two 
pixelated detectors and utilise the laws of conservation of momentum and energy to infer the most 
probable trajectories of the scattered and/or absorbed radiation fields. The first detector scatters the 
gamma photon, which results in an electron being emitted and its energy measured. The second 
detector absorbs the scattered gamma photon and measures its energy. The location of the pixels 
activated in each detector determines the angle of scattering and hence the probable origin; the energy 
of the initial gamma photon can be calculated from measured energies of the incident and scattered 
photons [43, 49]. The neutron scattering camera similarly utilises at least two detectors and the 
conservation of energy and momentum. However, in this instance the reaction is between an incident 
fast neutron and a proton present in the proton-rich detectors in order to sense and localise the fast 
neutron source. The time-of-flight data of the scattered neutron is used to measure the energy of the 
incident neutron [19, 23]. Figure 6 shows the basic elements in two pixelated planes imaging system 
based on electronic collimation. 





Figure 6.  Schematic of basic parameters in Compton scattering camera (left) and neutron scattering 
camera (right). 
5. Passive detection systems of illicit radioactive materials 
The two modes of detecting nuclear materials and other radioactive sources are mainly active 
mode and passive mode. Active detection mode (not part of the work presented here) uses externally 
generated neutrons, gamma-rays or x-rays to interrogate radioactive materials. This approach offers 
in-depth characterisation of target radioactive material, especially for fissile materials, although the 
major drawbacks are that it cannot be used in many circumstances, such as in proximity with humans 
and in uncontrolled detection areas [6, 50-53]. 
In passive detection, an imaging system is used to detect and characterise neutrons and gamma-
rays directly emitted from nuclear materials and radioactive sources. In contrast to active detection 
technique, passive detection requires less architecture arrangement and conceivably lower in cost. In 
Safeguards Techniques and Equipment series by IAEA, approximately all gamma-ray non-
destructive equipment discussed in the report are in passive mode [31]. In the same report, the ratio 
of listed passive to active neutron assay equipment is 4:1. This clearly shows the impact of passive 
detection mode at the international level in safeguard and security applications. A common design 
is the Radiation Portal Monitor (RPM) which typically consists of several detectors designed in a 
rectangle shape located at a fixed site [5]. Some passive imaging systems can characterise the 
radioactive material, rejecting background radiation and estimating the source to system distance. 
Passive detection systems offer a safe and simple detection mode, although the drawback is that its 
absolute efficiency decreases with increasing shielding around the radioactive material [54]. Since 
passive detection depends exclusively on the radioactive source under investigation and the 
detection system used, the statistical quality of results and the time to detect a source of specified 
strength depends mainly on characteristics such as intrinsic efficiency, angular resolution, spatial 
resolution and time resolution, shielding, and source-detector distance.  
In this work, passive detection and identification systems are categorised based on the target 
radiation field; gamma-rays, neutrons and dual systems. In each category, the systems will be further 
classified into pocket-type instruments, hand-held instruments and large fixed or vehicle based 
instruments [32]. Another equally important classification factor is the purpose of detection 
instruments; summarised as detection, assessment and localisation, and identification [32]. The 
following review attempts to compare and appraise past and present passive detection systems and 
techniques found in the literature that have been predominantly designed to detect and deter illicit 
trafficking, smuggling and transporting of nuclear materials and other radioactive sources.  
5.1. Gamma-ray detection systems 




Common single crystal inorganic gamma detectors such as NaI, CsI, SrI2(Eu) and PVT (organic 
scintillation detectors) or CdZnTe and HPGe (semiconductor detectors) are popular due to their 
stable performance, high efficiency and relatively low price [31, 55-58]. NaI(Tl) is by far the most 
studied and most commercially successful inorganic scintillator [8]. However, single crystal imaging 
systems are far more sensitive to background radiation and are more prone to false alarms [3, 59]. 
Pairing single crystal detector with signal analysers, such as multichannel analysers might widen the 
scope of applications for this group of detectors [31]. However, imaging is almost always desirable, 
alongside detection, to enhance a system’s sensitivity, angular resolution, energy resolution and 
localisation of point-like sources [60, 61]. 
Physical collimation, in particular coded apertures, and Compton scattering techniques have 
both been adopted to enhance and improve the detection abilities of gamma imaging systems. Fixed 
installation coded aperture systems offer long distance and large area coverage with improved signal 
to background ratio [62, 63]. However, these systems are best implemented at border controls, as they 
require fixed or slowly moving targets. Problems and limitations, such as false alarms and timing 
issues, as well as proposed solutions for this technology, such as energy windows and baseline 
suppression, are frequently discussed in literature [64-70]. Hand-held coded aperture systems offer 
a flexible solution for detecting and localising of radioactive materials [71, 72]. In addition to the main 
goal of detecting and localising radioactive sources while scanning vehicles, people, luggage and 
cargo, other applications such as monitoring the extent of nuclear related emergencies have been 
suggested. Many mechanically collimated systems have found success in this field [72-75]. Table 3 
summarises coded aperture-based gamma imaging systems found in the literature, including their 
detection method, their size category and the purpose of application. 
Table 3. Coded aperture-based gamma-imaging systems. 
System size definition 





Fixed installation Detection and localisation [62] [63] CsI(Na)  
Fixed installation Detection, assessment and localisation [76] HPGe & NaI MISTI 
Fixed installation Detection, assessment and localisation [75] CdZnTe ORIGAMIX 
Fixed installation/ hand-held Detection and localisation [77] NaI RMC 
Fixed installation/ hand-held Detection and localisation [73] CsI(Tl) CARTOGAM 
Fixed installation Detection, assessment and localisation [78] (GSO)  
Hand-held Detection and localisation [71] CdTe-Medpixi2  
hand-held Detection and localisation [74] CsI(Na) RADCAM 
hand-held Detection and localisation [79] CsI(Tl)  





In the energy range of nuclear material gamma-ray sources (60 keV to  3.0 MeV) Compton 
scattering is the dominant photon interaction mechanism, that make Compton scattering technique  
the most appropriate technique compared to  other techniques [3]. Compton based systems feature a 
wide field of view with improved detection efficiency compared to mechanically collimated gamma 
imaging systems, especially for high-energy gamma-rays [3, 80]. In addition, Compton systems offer 
the ability to detect, assess and localise a gamma-ray source with an associated reduction in 
background radiation [81]. Fixed installation and portable Compton systems are the most common 
size categories [82-85]. The performance of these systems varies between detectors with some using 
low energy resolution, high sensitivity NaI(Tl) and CsI(Tl) scintillations [82, 83], while others use high 
resolution Si and HPGe semiconductor detectors [84]. Image reconstruction methods for Compton 
systems, such as Maximum Likelihood Expectation Maximization (MLEM), Maximum Likelihood 
Ratio (MLR) and stochastic origin ensembles, have been regularly studied and optimised for their 
direct impact on the performance of Compton system in this field [86, 87]. There are hybrid-imaging 
systems that utilise both Compton camera and coded aperture technology; examples include passive 
mask [88] and active mask [46, 89, 90] systems. The duality in imaging techniques aims to utilise the 
advantages of both physical collimation and Compton scattering. However, designs need to take into 




account the optimum arrangement of layers to avoid negating these advantages. Another promising 
technique in gamma-ray imaging are 3D systems that utilise coded apertures or Compton scattering. 
The 3D systems are used in assessing and localising smuggled and hidden sources by projecting a 3D 
image of the search scene, which allow faster and easier navigation in the area of interest [91, 92]. 
5.2. Neutron detection systems  
Although most nuclear materials emit either or both neutron and gamma-rays, heavy shielding 
of gamma-rays can greatly lower the efficiency of gamma-ray imaging systems, negatively impacting 
their efficacy in nuclear materials non-proliferation and safeguard applications. Neutrons are highly 
penetrating and nuclear materials emitting neutrons requires bulky shielding to completely conceal  
neutrons. Therefore, neutron imaging systems are extensively used in nuclear materials imaging and 
they offer an excellent alternative. Due to their high thermal neutron cross section (5330 barns) and 
low gamma-ray sensitivity, 3He gas filled counters have been the standard neutron monitoring 
technology for decades [31, 93]. Thermal neutrons detection efficiency for 3He gas filled counters  is 
a function of the amount of 3He gas and increases with increasing pressure. For example, a 72 in in 
height and 2 in in diameter 3He tube under in 3 atm pressure has efficiency of 3.05 cps/ng 252Cf. The 
main supply of 3He is the 3H purification process which has seen a dramatic decrease in the last two 
decades [93, 94]. This has led to a continuous search for alternative neutron detection technologies. 
Direct gas filled counter alternatives such as BF3 proportional counters, boron lined proportional 
counters and fission chambers have been commercially in use [31, 95-97], but they have shown to be 
significantly less efficient [94, 97, 98].  
Neutron sensitive scintillation detectors and semiconductor detectors are frequently used in 
neutron detection. Neutron sensitive scintillation detectors include liquid and plastic organic 
scintillators [99-104], glass scintillators [105-108] scintillating fibres [109] and bubble chambers [110]. 
Bonner spheres are examples of radiation detectors embedded in a spherical moderator layer. Bonner 
spheres are well-established neutron spectrometer instruments in the field of nuclear dosimetry and 
inspection non-proliferation [111, 112]. However, Bonner spheres has inherently low energy 
resolution and inverse relationship between moderator thickness and detection efficiency. 
Semiconductor based detectors are a less popular means of neutron detection due to their lower 
efficiency compared to the scintillation detection materials in this field and the occasional 
requirement of having to use foils or coatings of conversion material to convert neutrons into a 
detectable signal, usually electrons [13, 113]. However, their ruggedness and high-speed response 
make them an interesting option for safeguarding and security applications [114, 115]. Semiconductor 
materials such as 4H-SiC, diamond and CdZnTe have been investigated in literature for their 
applications in neutron detection [116-119]. 4H-SiC and SiC semiconductors are promoted for their 
abilities to work in high temperature and high radiation environments along with other desirable 
properties such as high energy band gap and lower production cost, compared to diamond that has 
similar properties [116]. Diamond materials, such as diamond high pressure, high temperature 
(HPHT) synthetic diamond or diamond grown using CVD, are mechanically durable and inherently 
radiation hard. Like SiC detectors, diamond detectors have a wide band gap, which makes them 
highly appealing for radiation detection applications at high temperatures [118, 120]. CdZnTe with 
neutron converting layer such as Gd are proposed for portable thermal neutron detection systems 
[119, 121]. Activation foils were suggested for safeguard applications as practical neutron flux 
measurement tool [122] 
As for gamma-ray detection, collimation techniques in neutron detection are deployed to 
enhance detection efficiency, angular and energy resolutions, increase the field of view and decrease 
the acquisition time. In addition, for screening vehicles, cargo and large containers, the imaging 
systems should be accurate with a low probability of false alarms and low sensitivity to gamma-rays 
[123]. A number of simulation-based studies discuss potential neutron imaging systems with physical 
collimation or neutron scattering/ToF based collimation [124-127].  An equally important aspect in 
nuclear materials detection is the discrimination method used to discriminate between neutrons and 




gamma-rays [128]. Because gamma-rays are almost always present in the background, discrimination 
methods are crucially important and has been extensively studied in literature [129-134]. A range of 
radiation detection and identification systems are commercially available from vehicles size [135] to 
handheld size [136-138]. For a more detailed review of portal radiation monitors, table 4 lists all 
neutron-imaging systems discussed and experimentally evaluated in literature for safeguard and 
non-proliferation of nuclear materials. The categorisation of proposed applications and the size 
definitions are based on those mentioned in section 4.  
Table 4. Examples of neutron imaging systems used in nuclear materials security, their collimation 
technique, properties and characteristics. 
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5.3. Dual gamma-ray and neutron detection systems 
Dual particle imaging systems detect gamma-rays and neutrons simultaneously and can 
differentiate between the two radiations. This method of imaging has an advantage over single 
particle imaging methods because it allows the passive detection and identification of a wide range 
of nuclear materials and other radioactive sources.  
There are two main groups of systems in the field of dual particle imaging. The first group are 
comprised of single materials that are sensitive to both gamma-rays and neutrons. The second group 
uses multiple detection materials systems with detectors not necessarily sensitive to both particles. 
The later imaging technique offers reduction in system complexity as additional discrimination 
techniques are not necessarily required. In addition, this category offers higher design flexibility, as 
the parameters employed to enhance system response to one radiation field are usually independent 
of the other. 
Materials sensitive to both gamma-ray and neutron have been investigated for their dual 
detection abilities since the 1950s [159, 160]. Examples of the list of detection materials range from 
inorganic scintillators [161-163], semiconductor detectors [164-166], glass organic scintillators [167], 
some classes of elpasolite scintillators [168, 169], some classes of liquid scintillators and plastic 
scintillators [170-174]. The common features between these detection materials is their superior 
ability to enable the distinguishing of gamma-ray signals from neutron signals by methods such as 
pulse shape discrimination and pulse height discrimination [133, 134, 170, 175]. A handful of fixed 
installation and portable monitoring systems are suggested for security and non-proliferation 
applications are found in the literature. The scintillation materials used in these systems vary 
dramatically with  6Li(Eu) and Li-glass detectors, EJ-309 liquid scintillators and CLYC elpasolite 
detectors being popular [162, 176-178]  with some also utilising coded aperture collimation to enhance 
imaging characteristics [179, 180]. A number of examples of hand-held and pocket size systems for 
monitoring purposes similarly exist; almost all detection materials in this size category are based on 
plastic scintillators or elpasolite scintillation materials [99, 181-184]. These systems offer flexibility 
and fast response, albeit with a limited field of view.  
Since 2004, the research on multiple detection materials imaging systems for security and non-
proliferation applications has increased. Systems abilities varies according to the detection and 
collimation method and the size of the system. Table 5 presents a timeline of multiple detectors 
imaging systems discussed in literature along with their collimation and detection techniques 
between 2004 and 2016.  
Table 5. Timeline of Dual particle multiple detectors imaging system in security and non-proliferation 
applications. 
 
Year AUTHOR AND REFERENCE COLLIMATION MAIN DETECTION MATERIALS 
2004 Aryaeinejad, R. and Spencer, D. [185] None 6Li and 7Li-loaded glass scintillators 
2007 Baker et al. [186] None NaI(Tl) and LiI(Eu) 
2008 Enqvist et al. [187] None Cross correlation  BC-501A 
2009 Runkle et al. [188] None NaI(Tl) and 3He 
2011 Polack et al. [189] 
Compton and 
neutron scattering 
NaI(Tl) and EJ-309 
2012 Cester et al. [190] None LaBr(Ce), NaI(Tl), NE-213 and 3He 
2013 Ayaz-Maierhafer et al  [191] Coded aperture CsI and EJ-309 
2014 Poitrasson-Rivière etal  [192] 
Compton and 
neutron scattering 
NaI(Tl) and EJ-309 
2016 Cester et al. [193] Null EJ-420, EJ-560 and EJ-299-33A 





A number of research has been undertaken and investments have been made into large area 
coverage using a network of detectors. This concept has been around for over a decade [194-196], 
however, the realisation of the advantages of this technique along with the advances in network and 
communication fields will lead to new developments in this area. Examples of network systems and 
algorithms in this field are RAdTrac network system for gamma detectors, particle filter algorithm 
for a network of gamma counters and the ROSD-RSD algorithm method [197-201]. Other systems like 
identiFINDER S900 [202] and SmartShieldTM v2.0 [203] are commercially available for radionuclides 
identification and tracking. 
6. Conclusion  
Illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and radioactive materials is a cross-border problem that 
must be tackled globally. Robust and efficient detection equipment and radiation detection systems 
stand on the front line of defence against the acts of illicit trafficking. However, understanding the 
different parameters that affect the choice of detection equipment and/or radiation detection systems 
can greatly help installing the most affective detection techniques. The parameters that have most 
effect are (more details in section 3): 
 
 Security agencies and legislation bodies requirements. 
 Areas under surveillance and place of implementation. 
 Image quality requirement. 
 Timing and speed requirements.  
 
Once the main requirements are established, the options can be then investigated within 
detection and/or imaging techniques of gamma-ray sensitive systems, neutron sensitive systems or 
dual gamma-ray and neutron sensitive systems. Each technique has its advantages over the others 
and the main stage in planning to install a detection system that will positively contribute in deterring 
illicit trafficking is to investigate and study each implementation site individually. 
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